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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Before the inception of consumer protection laws, the cornerstone of 
common-law consumer protection litigation was caveat emptor¾“let the 
buyer beware.”1  Under this standard, aggrieved consumers were forced to 
rely on common-law fraud claims when seeking relief for any 
 
*J.D., 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
 1  Joanna Shepherd, The Expansion of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act: Causes and 
Consequences, THE AMERICAN NEW JERSEY CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE,  
http://www.civiljusticenj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/14Oct_Shepherd_TheExpansionO
fNJCFA_CausesAndConsequences.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
D’ALIA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/19  6:37 PM 
110 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
misrepresentations regarding the nature or quality of goods they purchased.2  
While common-law fraud claims theoretically provided consumers an 
avenue for redress, the requirements to obtain such relief created a strenuous 
uphill battle for plaintiffs.3 
The common-law fraud requirements reflected “assumptions about the 
symmetry of the consumer-merchant relationship.”4  It was assumed that 
consumers and merchants had equal bargaining power and were on a level 
playing field.5  These assumptions, however, were undermined at the turn of 
the twentieth century, when the scales began to tip in favor of sellers.6  The 
growing complexity of consumer products left buyers unable to determine 
the quality and nature of the products they were purchasing.7  Conversely, 
sellers became larger, more sophisticated, and further removed from their 
consumers.8  This changing relationship between manufacturers and 
consumers created a belief among the general public that manufacturers, who 
were now dealing with product disputes internally, were escaping liability 
for unfair practices.9 
Seeking to address the growing power imbalance between consumers 
and sellers, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC 
Act”) in 1914.10  The FTC Act created the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC” or the “Commission”) and gave the FTC the power to define what 
constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in or affecting 
commerce.11  Additionally, the FTC Act gave the FTC the authority to 
protect consumers against such unfair or deceptive acts or practices.12  
Recognizing that “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” could include a 
wide variety of commercial dealings, Congress limited the law’s 
enforcement by: (1) allowing only the FTC to sue under the FTC Act, and 
(2) limiting the FTC’s relief to injunctive relief.13  While the FTC Act was 
initially well-received, it was soon viewed as ineffective due to political 
 
 2  Id. (stating that “[c]ontract and tort law provided some remedies for major breaches of 
the merchant-consumer relationship, with aggrieved consumers resorting to fraud claims for 
misrepresentations as to the nature or quality of purchased goods for single transactions.”). 
 3  Id. (requiring that common-law fraud claims are: “an intentional misstatement of fact 
delivered with the purpose of deceiving the victim, the victim’s justified reliance, and 
demonstrable damages . . . .”). 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. at 4. 
 7  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 4. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. at 5. 
 12  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 13  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 5. 
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influence, mismanagement, lack of direction, and confusion regarding the 
Commission’s consumer protection mission.14  In response, several states 
adopted their own consumer protection laws in the 1960s and 1970s.15 
New Jersey enacted one of the first state consumer fraud statutes in the 
nation.16  In 1960, the New Jersey Legislature passed the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act (the “NJCFA” or the “Act”), which prohibited “fraud, 
deception, false promises, and similar misrepresentations or omissions.”17  
The NJCFA allowed the state Attorney General to “investigate unlawful 
practices and seek injunctions and restitutions for violations of the consumer 
fraud statute.”18  In 1971, the New Jersey Legislature amended the NJCFA, 
adding provisions allowing for private causes of action by individual 
consumers, and mandating treble damages against parties found in violation 
of the Act.19 
Following its 1971 amendment, the NJCFA gained a reputation as one 
of the strongest consumer protection statutes in the United States.20  Liberal 
interpretations of the NJCFA by New Jersey state courts strengthened and 
broadened the application of the Act’s provisions.21  This broad application 
of the Act has been criticized by many in the legal community, who view it 
as an invitation to bring excessive, and sometimes frivolous, litigation into 
the state’s courts.22  Critics of the Act asserted that New Jersey’s judiciary 
interpreted the Act to apply outside of the state.23  “Many New Jersey courts 
have ruled that the [NJ]CFA affords a claim to residents of other states, for 
transactions occurring in other states, simply because the defendant is 
headquartered in New Jersey.”24  This interpretation of the Act has been 
criticized because it allows a statute intended to protect New Jersey 
consumers to instead benefit out-of-state consumers and lawyers “at the 
expense of New Jersey businesses and employees.”25 
 
 14  Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 
47 n.1 (1969)). 
 15  Id. at 5–6.  
 16  Id. at 6. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Lisa J. Trembly & Michael F. Bevacqua, Back to the Future with the Consumer Fraud 
Act: New Jersey Sets the Standard for Consumer Protection, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 193, 
197 (2004) (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)). 
 20  Id. at 194 (citing Press Release, Governor William T. Cahill, Assembly Bill No. 2402 
(June 29, 1971)). 
 21  Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 257 (2002) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994)). 
 22  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
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Interpreting the NJCFA to apply nationwide has created a loophole that 
upsets the statute’s balance of “consumer-protecting benefits” against 
“commerce-restraining costs.”26  In 2010, the New Jersey Legislature 
recognized the need to close this loophole and proposed an amendment to 
the Act.27  The amendment would have placed “jurisdictional limits on the 
events giving rise to claims that consumers can bring under the [A]ct.”28  It 
would have also “narrow[ed] the statute’s application to only those claims 
arising out of transactions that occurred in [the] state.”29  However, both 
proposed amendments, N.J. A.B. 3333 and N.J. S.B. 2855, progressed no 
further than introduction to the Assembly Committee on Consumer Affairs 
and the Senate Committee on Commerce, respectively.30  Thereafter, neither 
bill was ever voted on.31 
However, in the Legislature’s 2018 session, a similar bill, N.J. A.B. 
303, proposed to, among other things, amend the Act and limit individual 
causes of action solely to New Jersey residents.32  This bill would limit 
application of the NJCFA “only to New Jersey residents, or to transactions 
that take place in the State.”33 
This note will discuss why the Legislature’s newly-proposed 
amendment to the NJCFA should be signed into law.  The proposed 
amendment would prevent out-of-state residents from filing claims against 
companies headquartered in New Jersey for transactions occurring outside 
the state.  Such an amendment is needed now more than ever, with consumer 
fraud litigation related to the sale of prescription opioids increasing across 
the country.34  Without the protection of an amendment to the NJCFA, such 
litigation would be especially problematic in New Jersey,  the epicenter of 
the global pharmaceutical industry.35 
Part II of this note will examine the NJCFA: discuss its legislative 
 
 26  Id. 
 27  Lisa Ann T. Ruggiero & Erica R. Stein, N.J.’s Consumer Fraud Act: A Runaway Train, 
N.J.L.J. (June 8, 2011), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202496524907/?slreturn 
=20171010164657.  
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  A.B. 3333, 2010 Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); S.B. 2855, 2010 
Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010). 
 31  A.B. 3333, 2010 Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010); S.B. 2855, 2010 
Leg., 214th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2010). 
 32  A.B. 303, 2018 Leg., 218th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 33  Id. 
 34  David Schwartz, David Talarico & Giovanni Ciavarra, Opioid Litigation: What’s On 
The Horizon, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/955070/opioid-
litigation-what-s-on-the-horizon. 
 35  NJ & Pharmaceuticals: New Jersey Leads the World, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS ACTION 
CENTER (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/documents/industry/Pharma.pdf.  
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history, specific provisions, available damages, and the requirements for 
private causes of action by consumers.  Part III will discuss the provisions 
that differentiate the NJCFA from other state consumer fraud acts, and 
decisions by New Jersey courts that have applied the NJCFA 
extraterritorially.  Part IV will explore the potential ramifications that 
nationwide application of the Act would have on the state’s pharmaceutical 
industry and judicial system, given the current increase in opioid litigation.  
It will also argue why an amendment restricting consumer fraud claims to 
transactions occurring in the state is necessary considering the 
aforementioned concerns. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 
A. The Act’s Legislative History 
In 1960, the New Jersey Legislature first passed the NJCFA.36  The 
Legislature’s intent in passing the Act was “to address sharp practices and 
dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate whereby the 
consumer could be victimized by being lured into a purchase through 
fraudulent, deceptive, or other similar kinds of selling or advertising 
practices.”37  At its inception, only the state Attorney General could enforce 
the Act.38  “The original Act gave the Attorney General the exclusive 
authority to investigate unlawful practices and to obtain injunctions against 
any persons engaging in, or about to engage in, unlawful practices and to 
seek restitution parens patriae for those individuals harmed by the unlawful 
acts.”39 
Eleven years later, the Legislature amended the Act, and transformed it 
into one of the most consumer-friendly fraud protection statutes in the 
country.40  The most significant changes of the 1971 amendment were 
provisions that: (1) allowed individual consumers to bring private causes of 
action, and (2) instituted mandatory treble damages.41  Private causes of 
action allowed victims of consumer fraud to be compensated for the losses 
they suffered, which meant that aggrieved consumers would no longer need 
 
 36  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 196. 
 37  Id. (citing Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 271 (1978)). 
 38  Id. (citing Daaleman, 77 N.J. at 271) (emphasis added)). 
 39  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 9; see also Richard C. Ausness, Prescription Drug Abuse: 
The Law’s Struggle to Address an Epidemic: The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against 
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2014) (“In a parens patriae action, 
the state contends that it has standing to sue to protect its ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests. A quasi-
sovereign interest is one that is distinct from the interests of particular parties and includes 
such things as an interest in the health and well-being¾both physical and economic¾of its 
residents in general.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 40  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 196. 
 41  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.11–2.12 (West 2004)). 
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to rely solely on the Attorney General for relief.42  Treble damages were also 
now available to punish the perpetrators of fraud and prevent them from 
engaging in further fraudulent behavior.43  It was thought that treble damages 
would benefit injured consumers by making consumer fraud cases more 
attractive for attorneys to take on.44 
Notably, there are fundamental differences between actions brought by 
the Attorney General and private actions brought by injured consumers.45  
For one, in private actions, plaintiffs have a greater burden to show that they 
have standing.46  Consumers must show an “ascertainable loss” of money or 
property to have standing to bring a consumer fraud action.47  Conversely, 
the Attorney General can sue for purely injunctive relief, bringing suit to 
enjoin the offender from going forward in violation of law.48 
Concerning violations, a seller violates the NJCFA when it commits an 
“unlawful practice” against a consumer.49  The Act explicitly defines what 
an unlawful practice is and indicates that there are several ways in which a 
seller can commit an unlawful practice.50  For example, it is an unlawful 
practice for someone to operate under a name or in a manner which would 
lead a consumer to believe they are affiliated “with a department or agency 
of the federal or state government” when, in reality, no such affiliation 
exists.51  Unlawful practices can also be committed in other ways, including 
mislabeling Kosher foods or making improper representations regarding 
used cars.52 
The 1971 amendment expanded the scope of what constitutes an 
“unlawful practice” to include “unconscionable commercial practices.”53  
While “unconscionable commercial practices” are not defined in the Act,  
New Jersey Supreme Court jurisprudence defined it as “an amorphous 
 
 42  Id. at 197 (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)). 
 43  Id.; see also Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “treble 
damages” as “[d]amages that, by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that 
the fact-finder is owed.”). 
 44  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197.  
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. (citing Weinberg v. Sprint Corp., 173 N.J. 233, 257 (2002)). 
 47  Id; see also Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC., 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005) 
(defining “ascertainable loss” as the type of damage that can be quantified or measured). 
 48  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197; see also Injunction, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “injunction” as “[a] court order commanding or 
preventing an action.”). 
 49  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197. 
 50  Id. at 199.  
 51  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.1 (West 2016).  
 52  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-64 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 56:8-68 (West 2016). 
 53  D’Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. Super. 11, 24 (App. Div. 1985). 
D’ALIA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/19  6:37 PM 
2019] EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NJCFA 115 
concept obviously designed to establish a broad business ethic.”54  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court also interpreted the term “unconscionable” as 
suggesting a “lack of good faith, honesty in fact, and observance of fair 
dealing.”55  Despite the aforementioned guidance from the state’s judiciary, 
there are no bright-line rules for when a seller commits an unlawful 
practice.56  Instead, what constitutes an unlawful practice is a fact-sensitive 
determination that is judged on a case-by-case basis.57 
B. The Act’s Provisions 
The NJCFA applies to “all consumer transactions that involve the sale 
of consumer merchandise or services generally sold to the public at large.”58  
The Act forbids the commission of an “unlawful practice,” which is defined 
as follows: 
[T]he act, use or employment, by any person of any 
unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false 
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing 
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale 
or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the 
subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or 
not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged 
thereby is declared to be an unlawful practice . . .59 
The Act’s terms and purposes were drafted to be intentionally broad in 
order to encompass a wide scope of activities.60  “Merchandise” includes 
“any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services, or anything offered, 
directly or indirectly to the public for sale.”61  A “sale” is defined as “any 
sale, rental or distribution, offer for sale, rental or distribution or attempt to 
 
 54  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 197 (citing Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522 
(1971)). 
 55  Id. at 197–98 (citing Kugler, 58 N.J. at 543). 
 56  Id. at 198. 
 57  Id. at 198–200 (“Pursuant to the Act, the Division of Consumer Affairs has enacted 
extensive regulations to govern many of the practices susceptible to consumer-fraud 
violations, such as home-improvement contracts.  Specific regulations adopted by the 
Division which govern the conduct of certain businesses include: Deceptive Mail Order 
Practices; Meat Sales; Banned Hazardous Products; the Delivery of Household Furniture and 
Furnishings; Merchandise Advertising; Servicing and Repairing of Home Appliances; the 
Sale of Animals; Unit Pricing of Consumer Commodities in Retail Establishments; Disclosure 
of Refund Policy in Retail Establishments; Home Improvement Practices; Resale of 
Entertainment Tickets; Sale of Food Represented as Kosher; Deceptive Practices Concerning 
Watercraft Repair; Toy and Bicycle Safety; Health Club Services; Motor Vehicle Advertising 
Practices; Automotive Sales Practices; and Automotive Repairs.”).   
 58  Id. at 198–200. 
 59   N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 2016). 
 60  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 198 (citing New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 
203 N.J. Super. 486, 499 (App. Div. 1985)). 
 61  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c) (West 2016)).  
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directly or indirectly sell, rent or distribute.”62  “Persons” are “any natural 
person or any business entity such as partnerships, corporations, companies, 
associations, etc.”63  At its core, the Act seeks to prohibit fraud.64  As they 
have with the Act’s other terms and provisions, New Jersey’s courts have 
expansively interpreted the definition of “fraud.”65  It is understood to 
include “any misrepresentation or knowing omission of a material fact 
regarding the sale of merchandise with the intent that the consumer will rely 
upon the misrepresentation or omission.”66 
The Act specifically prohibits unlawful practices and unconscionable 
commercial practices “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any 
merchandise or real estate.”67  Unlawful practices come in three forms: (1) 
an affirmative act; (2) a knowing omission; or (3) a violation of an 
administrative regulation.68  Regardless of the type of unlawful practice, the 
“capacity to mislead” is a central tenet of each action that the court 
examines.69  Notably, only the potential for a consumer to be misled is 
required to find that a seller committed an unlawful practice.  There is no 
requirement that a seller actually mislead a consumer.70 
Unlike the capacity to be misled, the requirement of scienter differs for 
each type of unlawful practice.  “Scienter” is “a degree of knowledge that 
makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or 
omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, especially as a 
ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.”71  When a seller’s 
unlawful practice is an affirmative act, there is no scienter requirement 
necessary to prove that the seller committed an unlawful practice.72  To have 
a consumer fraud claim, the injured consumer must merely show that he or 
she sustained an ascertainable loss from the seller’s action.73  However, the 
scienter requirement is essential for such a claim if the unlawful practice by 
omission.74  To succeed on a claim of unlawful practice by omission, a 
consumer must show that the seller intentionally made an omission.75  
 
 62  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(e) (West 2016)).  
 63  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(d) (West 2016)).  
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 198. 
 67  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2016)). 
 68  Id. at 199 (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17 (1994)). 
 69  Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17). 
 70  Id. at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 16). 
 71  Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 72  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17–18). 
 73  Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 17–18). 
 74  Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18). 
 75  Id. at 199 (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18). 
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Finally, there is no scienter requirement when a seller violates “regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General.”76  Strict liability also attaches to 
violations of regulations that the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs 
implements.77  Therefore, in the final situation, a consumer must only prove 
that the seller violated one of these regulations to succeed on a consumer 
fraud claim.78 
Once it is determined that a seller committed a consumer fraud 
violation, the Act lays out specific provisions for damages.  The NJCFA 
provides for both remedial and punitive damages.79  Remedial damages are 
available to compensate the victim for their loss and make them whole 
again.80  Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to punish the 
seller for his or her wrongdoings and deter them from engaging in future 
deceptive practices.81  In this domain, the NJCFA allows for the mandatory 
imposition of payment for treble damages, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and 
costs upon parties in violation of the NJCFA.82 
Though the NJCFA is regarded as one of the most consumer-friendly 
consumer fraud statutes nationwide, there are some limitations that preclude 
consumers from bringing actions under the Act.  For one, the Act itself 
imposes a six-year statute of limitations that prevents consumer suits brought 
under the NJCFA after the statute has run.83  Additionally, New Jersey’s 
“Entire Controversy Doctrine” could effectively bar a consumer fraud action 
under the NJCFA.  The “Entire Controversy Doctrine” states that “a party 
must assert all claims against all parties in a single judicial proceeding if the 
claims or parties have a material interest in the same series of transactions.”84  
Therefore, a litigant who does not bring a consumer fraud claim when suing 
for another cause of action may be unable to bring a consumer fraud action 
sometime in the future.85  It should also be noted that courts are barred from 
raising consumer fraud claims sua sponte.86  A court raises an issue sua 
sponte without prompting or suggestion from counsel.87  Therefore, a court 
may permanently bar consumer fraud claims if a plaintiff fails to raise them 
 
 76  Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 18–19). 
 77  Id.  
 78  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 199. 
 79  Id. at 200 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 249). 
 80  Id. (citing Cox, 138 N.J. at 21). 
 81  Id. at 200 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2016)). 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 203 (citing Mirra v. Holland Am. Line, 331 N.J. Super. 86, 90 (App. Div. 2000)). 
 84  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 203 (citing K-Land Corp. No. 2 v. Sewerage 
Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70 (2002)). 
 85  Id. (citing Prevratil v. Mohr, 145 N.J. 180, 190 (1996)). 
 86  Id. 
 87  Sua Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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in a pending action.88 
III. HOW THE NJCFA DIFFERS FROM OTHER STATE CONSUMER FRAUD 
ACTS 
A. Mandatory Treble Damages and Attorneys’ Fees Without Proof of 
Ascertainable Loss 
The NJCFA’s provision for mandatory treble damages sets it apart from 
many other state consumer fraud acts.89  While other state consumer fraud 
acts typically allow for treble damages,  these damages are granted at the 
discretion of the court in some or all situations.90  New Jersey judges, 
however, do not have this same discretion.91  This is because the NJCFA is 
one of the only state consumer fraud statutes that requires the imposition of 
treble damages.92 
The NJCFA also deviates from other state consumer fraud statutes in 
its handling of attorneys’ fees.  While other states permit courts to award 
attorneys’ fees, the NJCFA is unique in that New Jersey courts automatically 
award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, so long as a that plaintiff can prove an 
individual or entity committed an unlawful practice.93  Notably, to encourage 
consumers to bring good faith claims, plaintiffs can still recover attorneys’ 
fees and equitable relief even if they ultimately fail to prove a quantifiable 
loss.94  Therefore, to receive attorneys’ fees and equitable relief, a plaintiff 
must only show: (1) a good faith claim of ascertainable loss, and (2) the 
commission of an unlawful practice.95 
B. International Union v. Merck and Potential for Nationwide 
Application of the NJCFA 
Though the provisions for mandatory treble damages and the ease with 
which plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees sets the NJCFA apart from other 
state consumer fraud statutes, the Act’s most significant departure from 
similar consumer fraud statutes is its potential for nationwide application.  
 
 88  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 203 (citing Prevratil, 145 N.J. at 190); see 
also R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wademen, 246 N.J. Super. 615, 619 (App. Div. 
1991). 
 89  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 10. 
 90  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6 § 2583(b) (West 2017); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (LexisNexis 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) 
(West 2017).  
 91  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11. 
 92  Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2016)). 
 93  Id. at 10–11 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19). 
 94  Trembly & Bevacqua, supra note 19, at 201 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 251). 
 95  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Weinberg, 173 N.J. at 253). 
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New Jersey’s Appellate Division has held that consumers can sue under the 
NJCFA for transactions occurring in other states, so long as the defendant is 
a business headquartered or based in New Jersey.96  Most other states restrict 
suits under their consumer fraud statutes to resident-plaintiffs when conduct 
occurring outside of the state is at issue.97  On the other hand, the NJCFA 
“has never included a nexus requirement,” so “the alleged misconduct need 
not have occurred in New Jersey.”98  Because the alleged misconduct can 
occur anywhere in the United States, an increase in “litigation tourism” has 
plagued the state.99 
Both New Jersey’s state and federal courts have examined the 
extraterritorial application of the NJCFA, primarily as a choice of law issue 
in class-action suits.  In some cases, application of the Act to a nationwide 
class action is contingent on whether the court certifies a class.100  The 
Appellate Division applied the application of the NJCFA to a nationwide 
class action suit extensively in International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc.101 
International Union was one of many Vioxx litigation cases that took 
place in the mid-2000’s.102  The plaintiff in International Union alleged that 
Merck, the pharmaceutical company that manufactured and marketed Vioxx, 
a prescription anti-inflammatory drug, “fraudulently misrepresented and 
suppressed material information regarding the drug and its comparative 
safety and efficacy as compared with traditional competitors.”103  The 
plaintiff further claimed that Merck specifically targeted third-party health 
insurance payors across the country with false marketing, advertising, and 
promotions to justify the high cost of Vioxx when compared to similar 
drugs.104  Because of the alleged nationwide marketing and sales efforts, the 
plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all “third-party non-
 
 96  Id. (citing Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 
Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 275, 305 (App Div. 2006), rev’d, 192 N.J. 372 (2007)); see also, Elias 
v. Ungar’s Food Prods., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 233 (D.N.J. 2008). 
 97  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see, e.g., Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 
1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a deceptive practice must occur in New York to file 
under the Consumer Fraud Act); Avery v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 853 (Ill. 
2005) (limiting causes of action under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to transactions in the 
state); Marshall v. Priceline.com Inc., No. 05C-02-195 WCC, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 447, 
at *5–6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) (determining that Delaware’s consumer fraud statute 
is not applicable outside of the state). 
 98  Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27, at 2. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Int’l Union, Inc., 384 N.J. Super. At 275. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at 281–82. 
 104  Id. at 282. 
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government payors [in all States and the District of Columbia] who have paid 
any person or entity for the purchase of [Vioxx].”105 
On appeal, Merck argued (1) that the trial judge did not properly certify 
a nationwide class, given its conclusion that common issues of law or fact 
among the class’s members predominated; and (2) that the court should 
decide the consumer fraud dispute itself under the NJCFA.106  The Appellate 
Division upheld the Law Division’s class certification, as well as the 
application of the NJCFA to the class-action.107 
The court buttressed its decision to apply the NJCFA to the dispute by 
looking to: (1) the NJCFA’s legislative intent, and (2) the process in deciding 
which state’s law should apply to each member of the class in its 
predominance determination.108  The court stated that the Act’s legislative 
history supported a nationwide application of the NJCFA.109  The legislative  
history showed that the Legislature intended to make it “one of the strongest 
consumer protection laws” in the country.110  It also indicated that there is 
“little doubt that the New Jersey Legislature intended its Consumer Fraud 
Statute to apply to sales New Jersey sellers made even if the buyer is an out-
of-state resident and some aspect of the transaction took place outside of 
New Jersey.”111 
Aside from looking to the Act’s legislative history, the court’s 
predominance analysis further supported the notion that the NJCFA should 
apply to all members of the nationwide class.112  In order for a group of 
people to obtain a class certification in New Jersey state court, four general 
prerequisites must be met: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of claims or defenses of the class, and . . . (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
 
 105  Id. 
 106  Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 275. 
 107  Id. at 305. 
 108  Id. at 292–93. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. at 287 (citing New Mea Constr. Corp. v. Harper, 203 N.J. Super. 486, 501–02 (App. 
Div. 1985)). 
 111  Id. at 288 (citing Boyes v. Greenwich Boat Works, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 
(D.N.J. 1998)). 
 112  N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(b)(3) (regarding “predominance,” the New Jersey Court rules state 
that “[a]n action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of paragraph (a) [of 
New Jersey Court Rule 4:32] are satisfied, and in addition . . . the court finds that the questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy . . . .” 
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interests of the class.113 
In addition to these general prerequisites, other requirements must also 
be met by a plaintiff seeking to certify a class.  The additional requirements 
at issue in this case concern predominance and superiority, namely: (1) 
“whether the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,” and (2) 
“that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of the controversy.”114 
A critical aspect in determining whether a plaintiff satisfies this 
predominance requirement is discerning which state’s law should be applied 
to the members of the class.115  The court uses a “flexible governmental 
interest analysis” when deciding which law should apply in a multi-state 
dispute.”116  Such an analysis seeks to apply the law of the state which has 
the greatest interest in governing the ultimate issue of the lawsuit.117  The 
governmental interest test requires two steps: (1) “determining whether there 
is an actual conflict between the laws of the states involved,” and (2) if there 
is such a conflict, “identify[ing] the governmental policies underlying the 
law of each state and how those policies are affected by each of the state’s 
contacts to the litigation and to the parties.”118  Regarding the second step, 
the qualitative, rather than the quantitative, nature of the contacts is relevant 
to the analysis.119 
The Appellate Division upheld the Law Division’s finding that the 
differences between the NJCFA and other state consumer fraud statutes were 
sufficient to constitute an actual conflict.120  Agreeing with the Law Division 
that there was an actual conflict, the Appellate Division then turned to the 
second step of the analysis: identifying the governmental policies behind 
each state statute and how each state’s contact to the action and parties 
implicates those policies.121  A state does not have an interest in applying its 
law if that state’s contacts with the action are unrelated to the policies 
underlying its statute.122 
The courts consider several contacts relevant when examining 
 
 113  Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 284 (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(a)). 
 114  Id. (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:32-1(b)(3)). 
 115  Id. at 292 (citing Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 568 (Law Div. 2003)). 
 116  Id. at 293 (citing Erny v. Estate of Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 94 (2002)). 
 117  Id.  
 118  Id.. 
 119  Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 293. 
 120  Id. at 293–94 (discussing differences regarding private causes of action, the scope of 
transactions actionable, scienter, etc. as sufficient to constitute actual conflicts with the 
NJCFA). 
 121  Id. at 294. 
 122  Id. 
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consumer fraud cases: “the place of injury; where the conduct causing injury 
took place; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and 
the place of business of the parties; and where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centered.”123  The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws provides further guidance in fraud and misrepresentation cases.124  The 
court considers certain contacts in determining which state has the most 
significant relationship to the matters and parties in situations where the 
plaintiff’s actions in reliance on a fraud or misrepresentation were made in a 
different state than where the false representations were made.125  These 
contacts include: 
(a) the place . . . where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the 
defendant’s representations, (b) the place where the plaintiff 
received the representations, (c) the place where the defendant 
made the representations, (d) the . . . place of incorporation and 
place of business of the parties, (e) the place where a tangible thing 
which is the subject of the transaction between the parties was 
situated at the time, and (f) the place where the plaintiff is to render 
performance under a contract which he has been induced to enter 
by the false representations of the defendant.126 
While the place where the defendant made his or her false 
representations is relevant, “it is as important a contact in the selection of the 
law governing actions fraud and misrepresentation as is the place of the 
defendant’s conduct in the case of injuries to persons or tangible things.”127 
The Appellate Division in International Union held that New Jersey’s 
contacts in this case were extensive and substantial enough to give the state 
a far more substantial interest in this litigation than any of the other states.128  
The court noted that, among other things: Merck is a New Jersey corporation 
located in New Jersey; Vioxx research, development, and testing occurred in 
the state; the alleged fraud was envisioned and effectuated in the state; senior 
directors overseeing the development of the drug were located in New 
Jersey; a board of scientific advisors who expressed concerns about the drug 
was located in New Jersey; and parties compromised the clinical studies in 
question in the state.129  In contrast, the court deemed that “the contacts each 
prospective member of the plaintiff’s class has had with [the] litigation relate 
 
 123  Id. at 295 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)). 
 124  Id. 
 125  Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 295 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 
148(2)(a)–(f) (Am. Law Inst. 1971)). 
 126  Id. (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 148(2)(a)–(f) (Am. Law Inst. 
1971)). 
 127  Id. at 297 (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 148 (Am. Law Inst. 1971)). 
 128  Id. at 297–99. 
 129  Id. at 297. 
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to the receipt of the alleged fraudulent communications and the resulting 
economic loss.”130  The court reasoned that, by applying the NJCFA to this 
action, the court did not undermine the other states’ interests.131  The court 
also explained that, while it is rare to certify a nationwide class-action 
applying one state’s law, it is not unprecedented.132 
While the Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division’s certification 
of the class and application of the NJCFA in International Union, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ultimately reversed and remanded the decision.133  
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s reasoning for this decision 
revolved around the class certification issue, rather than extraterritorial 
application of the NJCFA.134  Both parties sought to make the choice of law 
analysis the focal point of their arguments on appeal, but the court declined 
and more generally analyzed the questions of predominance and 
superiority.135  Ultimately, despite strong arguments regarding the choice of 
law question, the court “express[ed] no view on the Appellate Division’s 
choice of law reasoning or the result it reached as to the applicability of [New 
Jersey] law to all members of a nationwide class.”136  Therefore, the potential 
for nationwide application of the NJCFA remains intact, despite the reversal 
of International Union on other grounds.137 
Other state consumer fraud acts contain provisions, such as those 
proposed by the New Jersey Legislature, which limit out-of-state consumers 
 
 130  Id. 
 131  Int’l Union, 384 N.J. Super. at 298 (“Application of New Jersey law will not 
undermine other states’ interests in compensating their injured residents because that interest 
is not actually implicated or compromised by allowing a consumer fraud action brought by 
non-residents of New Jersey to proceed against a New Jersey corporation.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 132  Id. at 303–04; see, Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 92 Cal. App. 4th 224, 243 (Ct. 
App. 2001) (indicating in a similar class action to Int’l Union, the California court stated that 
its “more favorable laws may properly apply to benefit nonresident plaintiffs when their home 
states have no identifiable interest in denying such persons full recovery” when the fraud 
claims originated in California); Clark v. TAP Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d 
538 (Ct. App. 2003) (A case where the Illinois appellate court affirmed certification of a 
nationwide class of “[a]ll individuals or non-ERISA third-party payor entities in the United 
States who paid any portion of the 20% co-payment or deductible amount for beneficiaries 
under the Medicare Part B for [prescription drug] Lupron . . .” because of “[t]he practical 
effect of applying Illinois law . . . to control conduct within the boundaries of Illinois, namely, 
the reporting by the defendants, headquartered in Illinois, of a deceptively inflated price for 
Lupron to uniformly defraud Medicare and its beneficiaries.”). 
 133  Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local #68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 192 
N.J. 372, 372 (2007). 
 134  Id. at 376 (concluding that “the [Appellate Division] erred in finding that common 
questions of law or fact predominate and that a class action would be superior to other 
mechanisms for adjudicating the claims.”). 
 135  Id. at 387–88. 
 136  Id. at 388 n.3. 
 137  Id. 
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to relief for transactions occurring within the state.  For example, the New 
York Court of Appeals determined that the language of New York’s 
Consumer Protection Act only addresses consumer fraud violations 
occurring within the state.138  The Supreme Court of Illinois, also citing to 
the language of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, stated that it was only 
applicable to transactions occurring within Illinois.139 
IV. THE NEED TO AMEND THE NJCFA WHEN CONSIDERING THE 
RAMIFICATIONS OF OPIOID LITIGATION 
A. The Opioid Epidemic and Related Litigation 
The United States is currently in the throes of an opioid epidemic 
unprecedented in its scope and severity.140  The statistics available on the 
nationwide opioid epidemic paint a disturbing picture of what has become 
the norm for many individuals in American society.  The use of opioid drugs 
has increased dramatically over the past few decades.141  Most experts trace 
the origin of the epidemic to the introduction of OxyContin, a slow-release 
opioid painkiller purportedly safe for long-term use.142  In the time since 
OxyContin’s introduction and the market approval of similar prescription 
opioid painkillers, over 2.4 million individuals in the United States have 
developed opioid use disorders.143  Of those 2.4 million people, ninety-one 
die each day from an opioid-related overdose.144  Despite the great dangers 
associated with opioid abuse, the number of prescriptions for opioid 
painkillers continues to increase daily.145  Compounding the crisis is the 
 
 138  Goshen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 N.Y.2d 314, 324–26 (2002) (“The reference 
in section 349 to deceptive practices [in New York’s Consumer Fraud Act] in ‘the conduct of 
any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state 
unambiguously evinces a legislative intent to address commercial misconduct occurring 
within New York . . . Thus, to qualify as a prohibited act under the statute, the deception of a 
consumer must occur in New York.’”). 
 139  Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 180 (2005) (explaining that 
the phrase “wherever situated” in the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act definition of “trade” and 
“commerce” refers to “any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any 
other article, commodity, or thing of value” and not to fraudulent transactions, limiting the 
scope of the Act to consumer transactions occurring in the state). 
 140  HHS Acting Secretary Declares Public Health Emergency to Address National Opioid 
Crisis, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (November 16, 2018, 11:23 PM), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/26/hhs-acting-secretary-declares-public-health-
emergency-address-national-opioid-crisis.html (stating that in 2017, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services declared the national opioid crisis a public health emergency). 
 141  Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id.  
 144  Id. 
 145  Id.  
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ready availability of heroin across the nation.146  Most opioid users turn to 
heroin to fuel their addiction once legal opioids become unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive.147  Consequently, the number of heroin users and 
heroin-related deaths has risen sharply, and in-step with the increasing 
number of opioid prescriptions.148 
Such a widespread increase in prescription opioid abuse has opened the 
door to a titanic number of opioid-related litigation actions.  Plaintiffs who 
have used prescription opioids are now filing lawsuits against 
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture these drugs.149  Some litigants 
are claiming that they were deceived or defrauded by pharmaceutical 
companies regarding the safety of these drugs.150  They are now seeking 
relief under state consumer fraud statutes.151  These consumers point to 
specific promotional language used by drug companies to describe and 
market their products.152 
State attorneys general, government entities, and consumers across the 
nation have brought actions under consumer fraud statutes.  In June 2017, 
Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter filed a lawsuit in state court 
against four manufacturers of opioid pain medication¾ Purdue Pharma, 
Allergan, Cephalon, and Janssen Pharmaceuticals¾ alleging that their 
deceptive marketing practices played a part in causing the state’s current 
opioid epidemic.153  Several counties in New York also sued opioid 
manufacturers after hiring a private law firm to prosecute the matter, with 
Suffolk County being the most recent county to file as of August 2016.154  
New York’s counties allege that the named drug manufacturers utilized 
deceptive practices in their promotion and advertisement of the drugs’ 
effectiveness and safety in pain management.155 
New Hampshire also filed a suit against Purdue Pharma concerning its 
opioid marketing practices.156  Specifically, the state alleges that Purdue 
 
 146  Id. 
 147  Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. 
 153  Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34; see also, Press Release, Oklahoma 
Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Mike Hunter files Lawsuit against four 
Opioid Manufacturers (June 30, 2017). 
 154  Schwartz, Talarico, and Ciavarra, supra note 34. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Nate Raymond, New Hampshire sues Purdue Pharma over opioid marketing 
practices, Reuters (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-hampshire-
purdue/new-hampshire-sues-purdue-pharma-over-opioid-marketing-practices-
idUSKBN1AO29W.  
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Pharma engaged in deceptive marketing practices through its promotion of 
OxyContin, which played a significant part in creating the state’s severe 
opioid crisis.157  Such practices include significantly downplaying the risk of 
addiction to OxyContin, as well as overstating the drug’s benefits to long-
term pain treatment.158  New Hampshire’s lawsuit follows similar cases 
against Purdue Pharma and other drug makers in Oklahoma, Mississippi, 
Ohio, and Missouri, as well as several cities and counties in California, 
Illinois, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and New York.159 
New Jersey’s former attorney general, Christopher Porrino, followed 
the trend and initiated a four-count lawsuit against Arizona-based 
pharmaceutical manufacturer Insys Therapeutics in October 2017.160  In its 
report on the suit, the Bergen Record asserted: 
New Jersey joins a growing number of states taking legal action 
against manufacturers of the drugs at the heart of a national 
epidemic.  More than two dozen cities, counties, and states have 
filed suits against drug companies alleging deceptive marketing 
practices and understating the addictive effects of drugs like 
OxyContin, Duragesic and Percoset.161 
Porrino alleged that Insys pushed fentanyl prescriptions (a synthetic, 
highly-potent opioid) to a broader population, and at higher doses, than 
approved by the FDA.162  In doing so, he alleged that the company violated 
both the NJCFA and the New Jersey False Claims Act.163 
Aside from actions by state attorneys general, individual opioid-related 
causes of action have been brought against pharmaceutical companies under 
state consumer protection laws.164  For example, the plaintiff in Bayless v. 
Purdue Frederick Co., Inc.165 asserted a claim against Purdue Pharma under 
the Connecticut Products Liability Act.  Ms. Bayless was originally 
prescribed OxyContin for back pain but quickly developed an addiction that 
 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. 
 160  Dustin Racioppi, N.J. sues opioid drugmaker Insys over its role role in deadly 
epidemic, THE BERGEN RECORD (Oct. 6, 2017), http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-
jersey/2017/10/05/nj-sues-opioid-drugmaker-insys-over-its-role-deadly-epidemic/ 
733854001/.   
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. (alleging that Insys “‘routinely’ misled consumers by falsely representing that 
doctors were prescribing Subsys based on their unbiased, independent clinical judgment. But 
that clinical judgment had been ‘co-opted based on Insys’s unlawful payment of kickbacks to 
prescribers.’”) 
 164  Richard C. Ausness, Prescription Drug Abuse: The Law’s Struggle to Address an 
Epidemic: The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. 
L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2014). 
 165  No. FSTCV095012157, 2011 WL 6117927 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2011).  
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led to her filing for bankruptcy and attempting suicide.166  While the Superior 
Court of Connecticut denied Purdue’s motion for summary judgment 
because questions of fact existed regarding the statute of limitations and 
proximate cause, the case was never decided on the merits of the Connecticut 
Products Liability Act.167 
Plaintiffs harmed by opioids have also brought class action lawsuits 
against manufacturers under consumer fraud statutes.168  For example, a class 
action was brought against Purdue Pharma in Missouri alleging, in part, a 
violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.169  Plaintiffs claimed 
that Purdue’s marketing tactics were aggressive, misleading, and coercive in 
depicting OxyContin as an “all purpose” pain reliever and in persuading 
physicians and pharmacists to overprescribe the drug.170 
In Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., the plaintiffs filed a class action 
alleging violations of the District of Columbia Consumer Protection 
Procedures Act for deceptive advertising.171  The class claimed that Purdue 
deceptively advertised OxyContin as a superior pain reliever, lasting longer 
than competing opioid painkillers.172  However, later studies showed that 
OxyContin did not last longer than less expensive alternatives, leading 
plaintiffs to allege that they were injured by paying a higher price as a result 
of Purdue’s advertising campaign.173  Consumers of OxyContin in Kentucky 
filed a similar class action against Purdue claiming, among other causes of 
action, a violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.174 
The aforementioned claims, filed against opioid manufactures by either 
individual plaintiffs, classes of plaintiffs, or state attorneys general, show 
that the public intends to hold opioid manufactures responsible for the public 
health crisis now crippling all levels of American society.  This case law also 
shows that consumer fraud statutes provide a potential avenue for holding 
such entities responsible for their wrongdoings. 
B. The Potential Impact of Opioid Litigation on New Jersey’s 
Pharmaceutical Industry and Judicial System 
An increase in opioid-related consumer fraud litigation would have a 
profoundly negative impact on New Jersey’s already-overburdened judicial 
 
 166  Id. at *3–4. 
 167  Id. at *33.  There is no subsequent history available regarding this action. 
 168  Ausness, supra note 164, at 1137. 
 169  Campbell v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1:02 cv 00163 TCM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31173, *8–9 (E.D. Mo. 2004). 
 170  Id. at *7–8. 
 171  Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp.2d 171, 172 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. at 172–73. 
 174  Salisbury v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 166 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548 (E.D. Ky. 2001). 
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system.  New Jersey’s consumer fraud lawsuits have increased substantially 
in recent history.175  The number of reported decisions under the NJCFA 
have increased 447% from 2000 to 2009.176  Not only is this figure staggering 
in its own right, but it is also far greater than the national average.177  
Unfortunately, these figures are  likely underestimated, since they include 
only reported decisions.178  Such statistics omit actions filed, actions settled, 
or actions whose decisions were unreported.179 
These statistics and data support the notion that a broad interpretation 
of the NJCFA has placed a substantial burden on the state court system.180  
This increase in consumer litigation is linked to the incentives consumers 
face when filing under the NJCFA: “Consumers respond rationally to 
litigation incentives, and states that invite additional consumer protection 
litigation through imprecise standards, low burdens of proof, and more 
generous awards ought not be surprised when enterprising lawyers initiate 
more litigation, whether meritless or not.”181 
Interpreting the NJCFA broadly to allow out-of-state consumers to sue 
New Jersey-based companies for transactions occurring outside the state will 
also have a destructive effect on one of the state’s largest economic sectors: 
the pharmaceutical industry.182  Known for decades as “The Medicine Chest 
of the World,” New Jersey is home to seventeen of the world’s twenty largest 
pharmaceutical companies.183  Such companies include, among others, 
Novartis, Johnson & Johnson, Merck & Co., Novo Nordisk, and Bayer 
Healthcare.184  Further supporting the fact that New Jersey is the epicenter 
of the global pharmaceutical industry is the fact that New Jersey is the site 
of 2,200 active or open clinical trials.185 
In New Jersey, the pharmaceutical industry is big business.  Statistics 
 
 175  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 12. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id.  See also, Bluebook Guide: Unpublished Opinions, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY 
(Nov. 17, 2018, 12:07 AM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=261289&p=2339386 
(“[O]nly a small percentage of cases are actually designated for publication by a court and 
published in a reporter.  Many cases are unpublished, but still available in databases, such 
as Westlaw, Lexis, Bloomberg Law, or elsewhere.”) 
 179  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 180  Id.  
 181  Id. at 13. 
 182  New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE OF NEW JERSEY 
 (Nov. 17, 2018, 12:21 AM), http://hinj.org/life-sciences-new-jersey/by-the-numbers/ (stating 
that the “total economic output supported by the biopharmaceutical sector in New Jersey . . . 
represented eighteen percent of New Jersey’s 2014 gross domestic product.”). 
 183  NJ & Pharmaceuticals: New Jersey Leads the World, supra note 35. 
 184  Id.  
 185  Id. 
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put into perspective what a crucial and substantial role the pharmaceutical 
industry plays in New Jersey’s overall economy.186  As of early 2017, 3,100 
life sciences entities operate in New Jersey.187  In 2015, the 
biopharmaceutical sector’s total direct impact on the New Jersey economy 
was $42.9 billion.188  The industry’s indirect or “spin-off” economic activity 
in that same year contributed an additional $61.9 billion to the state’s 
economy.189  The total economic output supported by the biopharmaceutical 
sector in 2014 amounted to $81.7 billion, which consisted of 19.9% of the 
state’s total GDP for that year.190 
The pharmaceutical industry is such a critical part of New Jersey’s 
economy that the state structures its tax code to benefit pharmaceutical 
companies and attract more to the state.191  In fact, a new state policy 
increased the allowable research and development tax credit to 100% of a 
company’s corporate tax liability.192  This tax incentive is especially 
attractive to pharmaceutical companies, considering the immense amount of 
time, energy, and capital expended on research and development (“R&D”) 
for creating new drugs and bringing them to market.  Such a strong incentive 
created by the state to attract and retain these companies could very well be 
undercut by the risk of nationwide consumer fraud litigation under the 
NJCFA.  Pharmaceutical companies may decide that the risk of such costly 
litigation could outweigh New Jersey’s R&D tax benefits. 
Many New Jersey citizens are also directly employed by the 
biopharmaceutical industry, or benefit from it, either directly or indirectly.193  
It is estimated that 89,500 jobs in the state are directly connected to the 
biopharmaceutical and medical devices industries.194  This number increases 
to 440,000 when considering jobs that are indirectly supported by these 
sectors.195  Therefore, 10.3% of all jobs in the state relate to the 
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biopharmaceutical and medical devices sectors, directly or indirectly.196  One 
in ten New Jersey residents are economically associated with these 
industries.197 
While it is clear that New Jersey citizens benefit greatly from the jobs 
created by the state’s pharmaceutical industry, the state itself benefits as 
well.  In 2015, New Jersey received a total of $7.7 billion in personal taxes 
paid by New Jersey employees in they the biopharmaceutical sector.198 
The pharmaceutical industry’s critical position in the state’s economy 
is also evident through New Jersey’s continued efforts to expand and 
strengthen it.199  In August 2017, “three pharmaceutical manufacturers 
received nearly [two] million [dollars] in combined Grow New Jersey 
incentives from the state Economic Development Authority.”200  As a result, 
pharmaceutical company Geri-Care is expected to bring more than 130 new 
jobs to the state, and is projected to spend $1.3 million on expansion of its 
manufacturing capabilities.201  Likewise, Aptapharma, another 
pharmaceutical company is also investing $4.9 million in upgrading its 
Camden site, which will create thirty-five new positions in New Jersey.202 
While the Act’s detrimental effects on the state’s courts and 
pharmaceutical industry support the notion it should be curtailed in scope, it 
should be noted that extraterritorial application of the NJCFA harms New 
Jersey residents and businesses as well.  The increase in NJCFA-based 
litigation is not necessarily benefiting those the New Jersey Legislature 
intended to assist.203  For instance,”[ninety-three] percent of plaintiffs suing 
pharmaceutical companies in [NJ]CFA class actions do not . . . reside in 
New Jersey.”204  The Act intended to benefit “downtrodden consumers 
finally vindicating economically-small but significant claims against 
uncaring businesses.”205  Instead, partly due to the Act’s broad interpretation, 
sophisticated litigants are taking advantage of “low burdens of proof and 
generous remedial provisions” to profit off of New Jersey businesses.206  As 
a result, these businesses raise prices to compensate for costs they face in 
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defending such consumer fraud suits, which harm New Jersey consumers in 
the long run.207 
The issue of significantly increased costs businesses face is 
compounded by the fact that they incur litigation costs for defending against 
consumer fraud claims, whether valid or not.208  New Jersey businesses are 
also burdened by attorneys’ fees because of the ease at which the NJCFA 
allows plaintiffs to recover these fees.209  While these increased “costs are 
initially borne by [New Jersey] businesses, they are passed on to [New 
Jersey] consumers through increased prices, fewer innovations, lower 
product quality, lower wages, and lower employment.”210 
The effects of economic prices paid by both businesses and consumers 
are especially problematic for the pharmaceutical industry.  It is important to 
consider the high research and development costs faced by pharmaceutical 
companies.211  Pharmaceutical companies often justify the high price of US 
prescription drugs based on high R&D costs.212  Many consumers already 
struggle to afford drugs necessary for their health and well-being, and an 
increase in costs for pharmaceutical companies would only increase the 
burdens that consumers already face.213  A decrease in innovation would also 
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negatively affect these companies and the consumers who rely on their 
products, as they would not be able to discover new treatments and therapies 
for diseases.  Finally, lower wages and lower employment would be 
especially damaging for New Jersey, considering that pharmaceutical 
industry employs a significant number of the state’s citizens.214 
The disadvantages created by interpreting the NJCFA too broadly, 
including applying it extraterritorially, are clearly against the intentions of 
the New Jersey Legislature.215  “While the Legislature expressly sought to 
create a consumer-friendly statute, it surely could not have meant to 
encourage forum-shopping among attorneys nor nationwide class actions 
against New Jersey businesses.”216  This unintended interpretation of the Act 
has had the result of discouraging business owners from operating in New 
Jersey, which in turn has decreased the number of jobs and revenue within 
the state.217 
C. The Need for an Amendment to Prevent Consumer Fraud Claims 
by Non-Residents for Out-of-State Transactions 
As opioid litigation becomes more frequent, many of the negative 
externalities that New Jersey will face can be addressed by amending the 
NJCFA to limit consumer fraud actions to in-state transactions.218  
“Eliminating the possibility of extraterritorial application will deter 
professional consumer litigators from drumming up nationwide class actions 
in hope of taking advantage of New Jersey’s indulgent [NJCFA] 
provisions.”219 
Such an amendment would not only bring the NJCFA back in line with 
the original intent of the Legislature to protect New Jersey consumers but 
would also protect the state’s businesses and economy.  As previously 
mentioned, the NJCFA’s legislative history indicates that it was designed to 
protect New Jersey consumers, not to allow consumers outside of the state 
to sue New Jersey-based businesses for transactions occurring outside of the 
state.220  Clarification that these types of actions are impermissible under the 
NJCFA, through an amendment to the Act, will protect both New Jersey’s 
 
fair or poor health (43%).”); see also, Howard LeWine, M.D., Millions of adults skip 
medications due to their high cost, HARVARD HEALTH BLOG (Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/millions-skip-medications-due-to-their-high-cost-
201501307673.  
 214  New Jersey’s Life Sciences: By the Numbers, supra note 182. 
 215  Ruggiero & Stein, supra note 27. 
 216  Id. 
 217  Id. 
 218  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 18. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11. 
D’ALIA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/19  6:37 PM 
2019] EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NJCFA 133 
businesses and the state’s overall economy.221 
An amendment that would have addressed this very issue was first 
proposed in 2010.222  New Jersey Assembly Bill 3333 was introduced to the 
Assembly Committee on Consumer Affairs on October 7, 2010, and New 
Jersey Senate Bill 2855 was introduced to the Senate Committee on 
Commerce on May 12, 2011.223  Neither bill progressed further than 
introduction to their respective committees, as they were never voted on or 
even discussed thereafter.224  Generally, the bills proposed “revise[] 
individual cause[s] of action under [the] consumer fraud act and make[] 
certain other revisions regarding the applicability of the act.”225 
The drafters of the amendment noted that the Act in its current form, 
“does not place jurisdictional limits on the events giving rise to claims that 
consumers can bring under the [A]ct.”226  A section of the proposed 
amendment sought to modify this issue with the NJCFA by limiting the 
application of the statute to “claims arising out of transactions that occurred 
in the state.”227  Doing so would greatly decrease the number of consumer 
fraud claims filed in New Jersey, including nationwide class actions.228 
An amendment similar to the one proposed by N.J. A.B. 3333 and N.J. 
S.B. 2855 has recently been introduced by the New Jersey Legislature in 
2018.229  Such a bill would significantly reduce the threat that opioid 
litigation poses to the state.  As previously stated, this amendment would 
limit the application of the NJCFA to New Jersey residents or transactions 
occurring in New Jersey.230  Explicitly stating that the Act is limited in its 
extraterritorial application would clarify that its purpose is to protect New 
Jersey consumers.231 
It is critical that the Legislature pass this bill, as such an amendment 
would strike a balance between protecting New Jersey’s vital pharmaceutical 
industry while still allowing out-of-state consumers an avenue for suit when 
appropriate.  This amendment would prevent an onslaught of consumer fraud 
litigation by consumers against pharmaceutical companies headquartered or 
based in New Jersey under the consumer-friendly NJCFA.  However, out-
of-state consumers would still be able to seek relief against New Jersey-
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based companies in contract or tort actions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Precluding consumer fraud opioid litigation from proliferating within 
the state by amending the NJCFA is critical to protect New Jersey’s 
pharmaceutical industry, courts system, consumers, and residents.  
Continuing to allow out-of-state consumers to sue companies based in the 
state for transactions that do not occur within the state will create a great 
harm as opioid litigation increases across the country.  It is extremely likely 
that the consumer-friendly construction and interpretation of the NJCFA will 
result in forum-shopping among opioid litigants, who will select New Jersey 
as the most favorable venue to bring their case. 
 
